tially each of the aforementioned issues, first in terms of the historical ques tions and then in terms of the historiographical ones. Examples in sup port of the points being made will be drawn mainly from the history of the Tendai tradition, but they could be drawn from any of the forms and branches of the Japanese religious traditions. It goes without saying that none of the complex questions raised in this essay can be dealt with ade quately in such a limited space. Some of the following observations might strike the reader as obvious, perhaps even trite, and others might be deemed simplistic or too sweeping and herein unsupported, if not unsupportable. Undoubtedly many of the following observations require clarification, and some demand much explication, but were the necessary qualifications and explications offered in this essay it would multiply in length manyfold and never get written.
Buddhism a n d Shinto
The first of the four issues identified above has to do with the relation be tween Buddhism and Shinto in pre-modern Japanese societies. Although the word Shinto is very much a part of our lexicon of Japanese religious terms, it is important to recognize that until the late medieval period there was no such a thing as Shinto in the sense of a structured, self-conscious tradition existing over and apart from Buddhism. Prior to that time what we call Shinto was a plethora of tribal and local myths, legends, beliefs, practices, etc. that were bound up in various ways and to varying degrees with continental myths, beliefs, and practices from pre-Nara (prior to the eighth century) times. In this essay Shinto refers to the predominantly in digenous strain in the mosaic of Japanese religion, but even that strain in cluded within it a great many Korean, Chinese, and even some Indian, elements.2 As KURODA Toshio has pointed out in an exceptionally impor tant article, before the modern era even the meaning of the word Shinto was unclear (1981， pp. 1-21) . Indeed, because Buddhist influences per vaded Japan well before Shinto qua Shinto was identified and defined, the very identification and definition of Shinto were, at least partly, Buddhist exercises.
It appears that in the minds of the pre-modern Japanese, Buddhist and 2 O ne o f a large num ber o f cases in w hich continental and indigenous elements were com bined from very early times is that o f the divinity G ozu T enno 牛 頭天王. G ozu, the ox-headed aeity, is an In d ia n m ythological figure w ho was identified w ith M uto T enjin 武塔天ネ申，a
Korean deity, and both were identified subsequently w ith Susanoo no M ikoto, one o f the most im po rtant diviruues in the classical Japanese myth recorded in the Kojiki. T his issue is dis cussed in MCM ULLIN 1988. Shinto views were thoroughly integrated. In evidence of this, for example, when Saich5 最 澄 , the founder of the Tendai school of Bud dhism in Japan, established the Enryaku-ji 延暦寺， his choice of the site (Mt. Hiei 比餒山) at which he built that monastery was most likely in fluenced by native Shinto (in the sense noted above) feelings about sacred mountains/ and perhaps also by Taoist notions about auspicious places and directions. The fact of the matter is that Buddhist monks in pre-mod ern Japan were also Shintoists, which is to say no more -but no less -than that they were enmeshed from birth in a cultural fabric that was shot through with a melange of indigenous and imported myths, symbols, rituals, and moods that taken together we call Shinto. Throughout most of J apanese history, foreign (Buddhist, but also Taoist and Confucian) and indigenous elements were amalgamated in a single, cohesive whole. In deed, Buddhism and Shinto were amalgamated institutionally, ritually, and doctrinally to such a degree that to treat them as distinct, indepen dent traditions is to misrepresent the structure of pre-modern Japanese societies. The tremendously intimate relation between Buddhism and Shinto, a relation that went through various stages of development and interpretation, is demonstrated by overwhelming evidence. Doctrinally, the Buddhist-Shinto amalgam is demonstrated by honji-本地垂处， a pairing technique that served to identify and draw out the relations between the foreign Buddhas and bodhisattvas and the na tive and nativized deities (kam i). In the late-nineteenth century the Meiji government gave indirect witness to the fact that the kam i and Buddhas had been united over the preceding centuries by its institution of the policy of shinbutsu-bunri 神仏分離（ "separation of the kam i and Buddhas"). By decreeing that thenceforth the kam i and Buddhas were to be separate, the Meiji ideologues thereby acknowledged that theretofore the kam i and Buddhas had in fact not been considered to be separate, and by decreeing that thenceforth the kami and Buddhas were to be separate as they had been in the past, those ideologues engaged in an exercise of rewriting his tory (see G ra p a rd 1984) . Ritually, Buddhism and Shinto formed one tradition throughout early and medieval J apanese history. From early times Buddhist divinities had a place in Shinto rituals, and th e kam i had a place in Buddhist rituals. Some Buddhist rituals were performed to honor various kam i, and Buddhist sutras were copied for the salvation of the kam i. To cite one of many pos sible examples: from the ninth century on, some of the rituals performed at the Enryaku-ji were devoted to SannO 山王, the protector kam i of Mt. Hiei, and from 887, in response to a petition by the monk Enchin 円珍 , the fifth head abbot of the Tendai school (Tendai zasu 天台座主〉 , two "yearly ordinands" (nenbun dosha 年分度者） were assigned to the Enryaku-ji with the duty of studying and reciting two sutras in honor of "the great Sanno divinity*1 (SannO daim ydjin 大明神 >.4 Various Buddhist masters, such as the famous Ennin 円仁(793~864), the third head abbot of the Tenaai school, worshipped and even had chapels built in honor of non-Buddhist divinities.5 F rom a reading of early and medieval J apanese literature it appears that there was a distinction in the religious communities between Buddnist and Shinto rituals; that is to say, the rituals were not so indiscriminately mixed together as to obviate any distinction between Buddhist rituals and Sninto ones, and therefore one might make the argument that Buddhism and Shinto were in fact quite separate traditions over the centuries from the earliest times. However, whereas it is true that there was such a distinc tion, it was just one of a number of distinctions applicable to rituals: there were also distinctions between, for example, exoteric rituals and esoteric ones, public rituals and private ones, state rituals and family ones, and so forth. The texts, paraphernalia, type of preparation, etc., required for the performance of an esoteric ritual, for instance, were different from those required for an exotcric one. However, for an Enryaku-ji monk to per form a ritual in honor of the protector kam i of Mt. Hiei (SannO) was no more incongruous, and would have required no more justification or apologetic, than would have been required, for example, of a shanagd 遮 那 業 （ "esoteric practice"）master who decided to participate in an ex oteric ritual. Thus I suggest that the basic distinction in the religious com munities in regard to rituals was not along "sectarian" (B uddhist-Shinto) lines but along functional ones: i.e., the distinction was based not on an 4 See SHIBUYA 1939, p. 24 . T he two rituals that those m onks were to perform were the dainichig6 大[1窠 • in which the DainichikyO was rcd tcd, and the ichijigO, in w hich the IchijikyO (i.e., the BodaidOjOshoselsuichijichDron'OkyC 菩提道艰所説一字 IJI輪 1{経 ) was re d ie d . For a study o f T endai devotion to S anno see YAMADA 1979. 5 In 868, E nnin's disciples, in keeping w ith the wishes o f their reccntly-dcceased master, constructed a chapel (the Sekizan Z en 'in 赤 山 择 院 ) at the southwestern foot o f M t. H ie i in honor o f a Chinese divinity to whom E n n in had prayed for a safe trip home from C h in a in 847. Sec TSUJI 1944, p. 340 . E n n in and other monks also prayed to "the divinities o f the soil" o f Q u elpart Islan d ， at which E n n in and his traveling com panions stopped o n the way back to Ja p a n , for a safe voyage. Sec REISCHAUER 1955, p. 299. awareness of or a sensitivity vis-d-vis the fact that certain rituals are Bud dhist and certain other ones Shinto, but, rather, that these particular rituals serve such and such a purpose, and those particular rituals so and so a purpose.
Institutionally, Buddhism and Shinto were also united from very early times through the nineteenth century. In the case of the Enryaku-ji, for example, over the centuries the monastery atop M t Hiei and the Hie 日吉 shrine at the eastern foot of the mountain formed a single complex (Allan Grapard uses the apt term multiplex).6 From the mid-Heian period most S h in to shrines were "branch shrines" (腸 •w/wt 末社） of one or other of the major shrines which themselves were affiliated with one or other major monastery, and they functioned as parts of the larger Buddhist-Shinto complexes. For example, from the 970s the Gion shrine (Yasaka jin ja 八坂神社） in Kyoto was a "detached cloister" （ 6 が似か別院） of the Enryakuji and functioned as a branch shrine of the Hie shrine, and the chief priest (a "Shinto" figure) of the Gion IK 園 shrine was a member of the Enryakuji ("Buddhist"） community.7 Similarly, the TDnomine 多武峰 shrine in Yamato province was a detached cloister of the Enryaku-ji from the latetenth century, and its members, Shinto clerics, customarily went to study at the Enryaku-ji. Eventually the Hie shrine, and thereby the Enryaku-ji, established "home-branch" (honmatsu 本 末 ) relations with 108 shrines spread throughout a number of provinces.8
This institutional intimacy is apparent also in the cases of two of the most important shrines, those at Ise and Izumo, that might be thought of as having been "purely" Shinto in character over the centuries. Until the Meiji period， with its implementation of the shinbutsu-bunri policy, the Ise shrine was literally surrounded by upwards of 300 Buddhist institutions, and thus that shrine was, in fact， located within, and formed a central part of, an immense Shinto-Buddhist complex. Similarly, the Great Shrine at Izumo formed the nucleus of a large Shinto-Buddhist institutional com plex until the end of the nineteenth century.
6 For instance, from the late H eian period the "sacred carts" (ontikoshi 御 神 輿 ） ，in which the H ie divinities were transported, were carried in procession by Enryaku-ji monks when they m arched on Kyoto to lodge a protest.
7 For a discussion o f the relation between the Enryaku-ji and the G ion "shrine" see MCM ULLIN 1987. 8 Interestingly, the Kasuga shrine, w hich was affiliated with the Kofuku-ji, the head monastery o f the Hosso school o f Buddhism in Nara, had fifty-one branch shrines, the same num ber as there were Kasuga divinities. See SHIMONAKA 1937 -1938 . O ne m ig ht wonder w hich came first at Kasuga, the branch shrines or the divinities, or if the n u m ber o f divinities expanded as the shrine assumed control o f more and more smaller shrines.
From the tenth century there was established a structure of twenty-two major monastery-shrine complexes, each of which included numerous "branch monasteries" (m atsuji 末 寺 ) and branch shrines, and which to gether wielded great power and influence from that time through the medieval period. In a recent study (1988) ， Allan Grapard argues that Shin to, as it is commonly portrayed， developed during the medieval period out of that structure of twenty-two monastery-shrine complexes.
Thus it is, I suggest, incorrect to speak as though religious institutions in pre-modern Japan belonged completely and exclusively either to the Buddhist tradition or to the Shinto tradition but not， at least at some level, to both at the same time. To put this point in strong terms: through the millennium from the middle of the Heian period (794-1185) to the mod ern age, there was no such a thing in J apan as an exclusively B uddhist in stitution. All so-called Buddhist institutions were at least partly Shinto, and all so-called Shinto institutions were at least partly Buddhist. In other words, all major religious institutions in Japan combined both Buddhist and Shinto elements into complex, integrated wholes. This institutional amalgam both reflected and generated the Buddhist-Shinto doctrinal and ritual syntheses.
Institutions, R itu a ls , Doctrines
The second major issue raised above has to do with the intimate relation between the development of religious institutions, rituals, and doctrines, and developments in the society-at-large of the time. Throughout pre modern Japanese history, those institutions, rituals，and doctrines developed almost invariably in response to, or at least in symbiotic con junction with, developments in other sectors of the society of the time, and most often in response to, or in conjunction with, economic and political developments. Developments in the monastery-shrine complexes in the Heian period, for example, most often reflected developments in the court world. For instance, the establishment of intimate relations between the Enryaku-ji and the Gion shrine had little to do, at least initially, with doctrinal matters but much to do with efforts on the part of the Enryakuji to develop an institutional power base in Kyoto, and with efforts on the part of the court to control the masses of peasants in the capital by assert ing control over a type of popular ritual， the goryoy e tiiPS ^, that involved large numbers of arms-bearing peasants (McMULLIN 1988) .
Indeed, the outcomes of many of the formal "religious debates" (shuron 示論) that took place among monks of the various schools in the early and medieval periods cannot be understood simply in the contexts of those debates. That is to say, frequently it appears to have been the case that the victor in a debate was determined less on the basis of his debating skills than on other factors, notably economic and political ones (i.e., the rank and power of the patrons of the monk who was declared to be the victor), and therefore it is necessary to take those factors into consideration in order to understand the reasons for the outcome of a debate.9 Throughout J apanese history there were, undoubtedly, many monks who devoted themselves to the pursuit of enlightenment, but much more than personal devotion has to be taken into account to explain the reasons even for that activity. Why so many people in certain ages decided to be come monks is a question that has to do with complex sets of economic and political factors. To account, for example, for the tremendous growth of the Mt. Hiei-Hie community in the ninth and tenth centuries from a hand ful of residents to upwards of 3， 000 members demands that we inquire into economic factors (such as the taxation structure of the times and peoples' efforts to avoid taxes by becoming monks and thus having their names stricken from the tax rolls) and political ones (such as the fact that the only avenues to positions of political power that were open to most people at that time were the religious communities), in addition to such factors as personal devotion or the presence in the Enryaku-ji of a number of great Buddhist masters.
To consider one example to demonstrate the foregoing point: in the year 818 Saicho petitioned the court for permission to establish a rule whereby all aspirants to ordination in the Tendai school first had to spend a twelve-year uninterrupted period of study and practice in seclusion on Mt. Hiei. It is possible to offer various reasons for Saich6's establishment of that rule (he wanted to develop holier monks， more educated monks, and so forth), but, without denying that SaichO had such motives, I would suggest that his main reason for implementing that rule might be dis covered by considering the growth of his community in the period from 807 to 818. In that period the court assigned Saicho twenty-four yearly or dinands, but by 819 fourteen of those twenty-four had left the Enryakuji: one had died, one was away on pilgrimage, two had quit the religious 9 A sim ilar situation appears to have prevailed in the case o f early and medieval "poetry debates.** T hat is, it is n o t clear from the contemporary essays on aesthetics and poetics that were written to explain why poem "X " was ju d g e d to be superior to poem " Y " ju s t why in fact poem "X " m erited that victory. Evidently factors other than the rules o f aesthetics a n d poetics were in flu e n tia l in the ju d g in g procedures in the poetry debates, ju s t as they were in the re ligious debates.
life to care for their ailing mothers, nine had transferred to other monasteries in Nara, and the whereabouts of one was unknown. Thus it appears that Saich6's seclusion policy, while serving perhaps various pur poses, was primarily a strategy designed to solve the problem of the loss of ordinands: by keeping his assigned disciples locked up on Mt. Hiei for an extended period of time, Saicho lessened the risk of losing them, especially to monasteries of the rival Hosso school to which almost half of those who abandoned him went.10
Furthermore, theories regarding the relations between certain and Buddhas, the honji-suijaku relations, often developed in response to or to gether with developments in the economic realm, namely the absorption of Shinto shrines and their lands into the large Buddhist-Shinto institu tional complexes. Thus, doctrine often rationalized andjustified econom ic developments, a n d ，at the same time, helped to make those developments possible. For example, the development and proliferation of esoteric (mikkyo 密 教 ) forms of ritual in the Heian period reflected im portant political and economic developments: namely, as the bureaucratic state structure (ritsurydsei 律令制)weakened in the early Heian period, the powerful families searched for other supports for their positions of power and privilege, and one type of support that they discovered and patronized was certain kinds of esoteric rituals that they believed to contain great power. Moreover, as we shall see, even the understanding of the nature of the politico-religious ideology changed in accordance with changes in the politico-economic conditions of the times.
Comparative Importance o j Institutions， R itu a ls ，a n d Doctrines
The third issue noted above has to do with the comparative importance of religious institutions, rituals, and doctrines in the pre-modern Japanese world, and the main purposes of ritual. In this context it should be noted that although it is convenient to use the words "Buddhism" and "Shinto(ism),'' it is important to be aware that those terms refer not just or even primarily to sets of doctrines, but to large numbers of highly concrete in stitutions and the people who belonged to those institutions. Religion's importance in Japanese history was due primarily to the religious institu tions, notably the monastery-shrine complexes, which made a tremendous impact-artistically， economically, educationally, literarily, politically, so 10 Info rm a tio n o n those monks is contained in a register, the Tendai hokkeshu nenbun tokudo gakushS meichS 天台法華宗年分得度学生名帳，that Saicho com piled in 819，and is repro duced in TSUJI 1944, p p . 270-274. This matter is discussed in GRONER 1984, p p . 125-126. cially, and so forth -on society for over a millennium. In regard to the question of the comparative importance of ritual and doctrine， Frits STAAL points out that what counts primarily in Asia are:
ancestors and teachers -hence lineages, traditions, affiliations, cults, eligibility, initiation, and in ju n c tio n -concepts with ritual rather than truth-functional overtones.. . . Like the other so-called religions o f Asia, Buddhism is characterized by the fact that ritual (in which all monks engage) is more im portant than mystical ex perience (which only a few attain), which is in turn more im por tant than belief or doctrine (a matter confined to scholarly monks or [observes Staal with somewhat cynical humor] reserved for Western converts, anthropologists, and tourists).. . [In Asia,] prac tice and ritual are more im portant than tru th , belief, or doctrine (1984, pp. 11-12, 17-18 ).
Staal's assertion of the preeminence of ritual in Asia is clearly applicable to the case of Japan. Primary source materials on the Buddhist-Shinto tradition(s) are replete with information on lineages and rituals: in the case of the Mt. Hiei/Hie complex, for example, those materials provide detailed information on what masters the various abbots studied under, by whom they were initiated and ordained, and to what lines of masters the abbots belonged. Those materials also include much information on ritual: on what rituals were customarily performed at the Mt. Hiei/Hie complex; on which abbot was the first to have performed a particular ritual; on how many days the performance of a certain ritual required; on what eminent people participated in a particular ritual on a specific oc casion; and so forth. There were, in every age, scholarly clerics who produced doctrinal tracts, but the primary activity of the vast majority of the clerics over the centuries appears to have been not so much the pro duction and study of doctrinal tracts but the learning, practicing, and per forming of rituals. In a recent study, Helen Hardacre provides evidences of the relative importance of ritual over doctrine in the case of ReiyQkai Ky5dan 霊友会教団， one of the so-called New Religions (see HARDACRE 1984， pp. 72， 75， 141)， and thus it appears that the preeminence of ritual in Japanese religion continues into the modern day.
In early and medieval Japan, the vast majority of rituals appear to have had less an "other-worldly" (having to do with the monks' attainment of enlightenment or salvation) than a "this-worldly" (genze riyaku 現世利益） purpose. From the earliest days, as shall be discussed later, the most im portant rituals were performed for the stability and protection of the state. Other rituals were frequently performed for the purpose ofbringing about the realization of specific, practical goals (the safe birth of a child, deliver ance from sickness, the designation of a certain imperial prince as crown prince, and so on), and those rituals were usually performed at the court or in the residences of the wealthy patrons of the monks who performed them. Clerics who performed efficacious rituals -that is, rituals that were believed to have brought about the intended effects-were rewarded by the rituals* patrons with finances, grants of land, promotion to high offices in the religious communities, appointment to the sogo 僧 綱 (the council that oversaw all matters pertaining to Buddhist monks and monasteries), and court tides. Thus, just as the rituals served the court dlite, they also served as the coinage whereby clerics could purchase power and prestige.
It might also be argued that developments within the Buddhist-Shinto tradition(s) may best be understood less as developments of new doctrines than as the appearance of new kinds of rituals. The rise of esoteric tradi tions in the Heian period can best be understood in this way, and the socalled reform schools of Buddmsm that developed in the early Kamakura period (1185-1333) might also be interpreted as movements that propa gated new forms of ritual rather than as new doctrinal traditions, each with a dramatically new and different interpretation oi important Buddnist concepts. Indeed, many ofthose new doctrines and rituals might have been less unique than has often been thought, and the Kamakura reform schools probably represented less of a break with the Buddhism of the Heian period than is commonly assumed. According to Kuroda Toshio, a mixture of esoteric and "exoteric" (kengyd 願教) teachings and rituals char acterized all Japanese Buddhist schools from the Nara period down to the modern age; all pre-modern Buddhist schools, including the Kamakura reform schools, were variations on a persistent Hexoteric-esoteric struc ture** (kenmitsu taisei ).!1 Kuroda's theory points up a problem in the commonly-accepted periodization of the history of J apanese religions.
Thus， were we to rank religious institutions, rituals, and doctrines in order of their relative importance in pre-modern J apanese societies, in stitutions would rank first, rituals second, and doctrines last R eligio n a n d Politics In regard to the fourth issue noted above, that of the nature of the rela tion between religion and politics in pre-modern Japanese society, there 】 1 T his issue is discussed in num erous works by Professor K uroda, to w hom I am deeply indebted for his k in d guidance d u rin g a year o f research in ja p a n in -1982 . See KURODA, especially 1963 and also 1967， 1975a , 1975b， 1980 , and 1983 are two sub-issues that might be addressed: an ideological one regarding the role that religious concepts played in the formation and formulation of state ideology, and an institutional one regarding the nature of the re lation between religious institutions (the monastery-shrine complexes) and the organs of government.
In regard to the ideological issue, in the period before continental in fluences made a strong impact on Japan, the justification for the posses sion of authority in society by certain "families" (u ji 氏 ) appears to have rested on the claim that those families were descended from certain ancestralA^mi, and thus their possession of authority was, as it were, a divine birthright. By the sixth century, Buddhist, Taoist and Confucian materials had begun to arrive injap an as part of a wave of Chinese and Korean in fluences that swept over the country. The formulators of the earliestjapanese political statements to have come down to us were familiar with those materials and used concepts contained in them when they were making their formulations. It was not the case that certain imported religious no tions were selectively adopted by a group of people who possessed a fully developed indigenous politico-religious philosophy, and still less an "extra-religious" political philosophy: rather, the ways of thinking ofthose people， their mental frames of reference, were profoundly shaped by and imbued with religious notions. In other words, some of the earliest state ments about the nature of authority in Japanese societies were religious statements; or, to put it differently, "political" statements were simulta neously "religious" statements.
Possible examples of the commingling of " political" and "religious" sym bols are many. For instance, in the first part of Article 2 of the "Seventeen Article Constitution" (JUshkhijd kenpd ヤ七条憲法) o f604 C.E., a "political" document, there is the "religious" profession that the "Three Treasures" (the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha) are the ultimate refuge of all beings and the absolute norm for all countries. Emperor Sh6mu,s con struction of a huge statue ofVairocana Buddha in the 740s is another case in point: by building that statue, which some might interpret as an exclu sively "religious" event, Shomuwas making the "political" declaration that just as Vairocana Buddha is the symbol and guarantor of unity and har mony in the universe, so he, ^homu, is the symbol and guarantor of unity and harmony in the state.
From the early periods ofjapanese history, state ideology was expressed in two sets of terms. One of those sets is indicated by the well-known phrase chingo-kokka 鎮護国家("the prosperity and protection of the state"). This expression is a statement of the belief that the state had divine guarantees, 
Obo and Buppo
The other fundamental politico-religious formula was that of the "mutual dependence of the 'Imperial Law' (6如王法） and the 'Buddhist Law' (buppo 仏 法 广 (obo buppo soi 相 依 ） . From the middle of the Heian period, Japa nese state ideology came to be enunciated in terms of the relation between the obo and the buppo. Although, as the use of these terms would indicate, there was a recognition of two " fonts" of politico-religious authority, those two concepts did not represent anything resembling "secular" and "relieious" laws, for both were equally "religious" and equally "political•" In deed, even the notion of the obo is an Indian Buddhist one (5kt. raja-dharm a), as is, of course, the concept of buppo (Skt. buddha-dharma) . In J apan, the obo concept also had Shinto overtones in that, as was mentioned above, the early ruling families justified their possession of power on the basis o f th e ir descent from certain ancestral kami， a n d therefore the uIm pe rial Law " had the sanction o f the kami. T hus, in reference to the first issue addressed in this essay, Buddhism and Shinto were also linked to gether in the formulation of state ideologies. From the eleventh century there appear in the documents declarations to the effect that although the obo and the buppo are two in terminology, they are one in reality. The obo, with its sanction of the kam i, and the buppof with its sanction of the Bud dhas, formed the two chambers of the heart of a single living organism, the Japanese body politic (see KURODA 1983 , pp. 8-22； McMULLIN 1985 .
F urthermore, in reference to a point made earlier, the relation between the obo and the buppo was interpreted differently in accordance with chan ges in the politico-economic conditions of the time. In the mid-Heian pe riod, for example, as the monastery-shrine complexes became richer and 12
In reference to a p o in t made earlier, Saicho's decision to b u ild n ine cloisters on M t. H ie i may have been influenced by Chinese geomancy according to w hich there were n ine direc tions (no rth, northeast, east, southeast, south, southwest, west, northwest, and center). The I Ching, for instance, contains schema o f the eight directions m oving o u t from the center. O n that model, the merits generated at Saicho's nine cloisters would permeate the entire country o f Ja p a n in all directions. stronger, the definition of the nature of the relation between the obo and the buppo changed from one that described the buppo as the servant of the obo to one that identified the two as equals. From the late Heian through the medieval periods, the relation between the obo and the buppo was likened to the relation between the two wings of a bird, the two horns of a cow, and the two wheels of a cart: the obo and the buppo were, so to speak, the two oars that propelled the Japanese ship of state.13 This new under standing of the relation between the obo and the buppo represented the "ideologization" of the fact that the major monastery-shrine complexes had become quite powerful (as powerful as the leading court families), a development that was made possible by a shift in the economic base of the major monasteries from state finances to patronage by powerful families.
Thus, as several modern Japanese scholars, especially Kuroda Toshio, have demonstrated, religion and politics were intimately related injapanese society from the pre-Nara age up through the Tokugawa period (1600-1868).14 From the earliest period ofjapanese history, "political" ideology was never formulated in isolation from "religious" ideology: political and religious thinking/language in regard to the state were so totally intertwined that to regard politics and religion as separate phenomena is to impose on early and medieval J apanese society a kind and a degree of fragmentation that it did not know. There was no politicsversus-religion dichotomy in pre-modern Japanese societies: all notions about authority were politico-religious. Indeed, in these societies, religion and politics were so commingled that the very use of the terms "religion" and "politics" in reference to them causes an interpretative splitting of them.15 13 In his review o f my book (1985) , M artin C ollcutt raises the question o f ju s t how pe r vasive and persuasive the ''dbd-buppd m u tual dependence rhetoric" m ight have been in the late medieval period. H e suggests that it was a one-sided rhetoric o n the part o f the monasteries, and that there is n o reason to thin k that the sixteenth<entury daimyd ever ac cepted that rhetoric "or anything like parity between B ud dhist claims and secular claim s." See COLLCUTT 1986, especially p . 406 . This topic requires further exam ination.
14 See the works o f KURODA, particularly 1975b. For exemplary studies that do for the de velopm ent o f state ideology in the Tokugawa period (1600-1868) w hat w ould be most valu able to do also for the developm ent o f state ideologies in earlier periods o f Japanese history, see OOMS 1984 , and HARCXTTTJN1AN 1988 . For a sim ilarly im p o rtant work on the M eiji period (186^-1912) see GLUCK 1985. 15 In the pre-modern Japanese lexicon there was no equivalent o f the E nglish word "re li g io n ." The word shukyS 宗 教 , w hich was first used in its m odern sense in 1869 to translate the G erm an term religionsilbung ("religious exercise") had been used prio r to that time to in dicate either the B uddhist trad itio n in general or one or other o f the schools o f Buddhism . See OGUCHI and HOR1 1974， p. 256.
R itu a ls and State Ideologies
From the earliest times inja p an ， religious rituals played an important role in state ideologies, and it is doubtful that anyone would have thought of them as having an exclusively or even a primarily other-worldly purpose as opposed to "this-worldly" (political, economic， social, etc.) ones. As tools whereby clerics, as well as members of the ruling ^lite who had rituals per formed on their behalf, gained and maintained power, the rituals were, in a very real sense, political tools. Because the proper and regular perfor mance of various religious rituals was believed to be a sine qua no n for the wellbeing and smooth running of the state, and to contribute to the acquisi tion and preservation of political power by the dite， then the performance of such rituals was part of the political process. Religious rituals were not ancillary to the doing of government; to "do rituals" was, in a very real sense, to "do government."
The most important rituals were those that were performed for the wellbeing of the imperial house and the inner circle of ruling families. Those rituals, and the religious institutions at which they were performed, played an indispensable role in communicating and reinforcing state ideology. As Paul Wheatley and Thomas See point out, ritual is "an impor tant component of the communications network of a society, transmitting information through both its content and its occurrence" （ 1978， p. 15).
The major state rituals of early and medievalj apan were customarily per formed at the aforementioned twenty-two monastery-shrine complexes which were the central component of the chingo-kokka ideology.16 In the words of Paul Wheatley, citing an earlier study of his, 4 4 [the great cere monial centers] functioned as instruments for the dissemination through all levels of society of beliefs which, in turn， enabled the wielders of politi cal power to justify their goals in terms of the basic values of that society, and to present the realization of class-directed aims as the implementation of collectively desirable policies" (WHEATLEY and SEE 1978, p. 16) . In other words, religious symbols were used for political purposes; ritual served power. From very early times injapan, the ruling ^lite used reli gious symbols to legitimate, and indeed sanctify, what was, when all is said and done, a fundamentally arbitrary structure of control and domination. As was seen in the case of Emperor Shomu, "it is only too evident that the Japanese rulers had mastered the art of cloaking power in a garb of sanctity" (WHEATLEY and SEE 1978， p. 17) .
Some scholars who acknowledge the intimate relation between religion and politics in the early and medieval periods claim that religion and politics became separated with the advent of the modern age (post 1868). I would suggest that this claim is not correct, because religion and politics are still intimately related in Japanese society, albeit in a fashion that dif fers from the ways in which they were related in earlier periods. It might be argued that that relation is somewhat parallel to the one between reli gion and politics in modern American society as portrayed in the H Amer ican civil religion" model offered by Robert Bellah and others (see RICHEY and JONES 1974) . Evidence of the continuing intimacy between religion and politics in modern Japanese society may be found, for example, in the roles played by the Meiji shrine, the Ise shrine, the Yasukuni shrine, the Soka Gakkai organization, and various other institutions.
R eligious Institutio ns and the State
As to the relation between religious institutions (notably the monasteryshrine complexes) and the state, the history of that relation is one in which, for the first few centuries (seventh to tenth), the court tried, but eventual ly failed, to enforce a strict control over those institutions. From the mid tenth century through the mid-sixteenth, a number of the major monastery-shrine complexes possessed so much political, economic, and even military power that they could not be controlled by the state.
The main reason for the monastery-shrine complexes' acquisition of political, economic, and military power was the court's increasing loss of control of the land from the mid-eighth century around which time pow erful families, especially the Fujiwara, and the major monastery-shrine complexes began to amass privately-controlled parcels of land that came to enjoy various immunities from court interference and, subsequently, from the authority of the shogunate's provincial "military governors" (shugo 守 護 ).As George Sansom once observed pointedly, "The truth is that the real source of power in Japanese life was the land-Land is the key to political history in J apan, at almost every point" (1958, p p .110 and 139) . Estimates of the percentage of the land that was controlled by the monastery-shrine complexes in the Heian and Kamakura periods vary wildly between twenty and sixty percent of the total: whatever the case, it was a substantial fraction of the total.
O n their estates the monastery-shrine complexes collected taxes and corvee from the people, and in some cases they even had juridical authority, that is, the right to police their lands and punish offenders of the law. There is much evidence of the economic and political power of those complexes through the early and medieval periods. For example, the Kofuku-ji/Kasuga complex was the de facto master of Yamato province for centuries. Similarly, the Mt. Hiei/Hie complex, which owned over 350 estates scattered throughout dozens of provinces, was the de facto master of most of Om i province where many of its estates were located, and it was also a powerful force in the commercial world in the medieval period. Ac cording to Kuroda Toshio, in the medieval period the institutions that im posed order and structure on those large segments of society that were not under the direct control of the military (bushi 武士 ) class were the monasteries and shrines.17 In early and medieval Japan, the monasteryshrine complexes provided for the residents of their lands a socio-politi cal structure that differed significantly from those headed by the court and the shogunate, and it appears that in the medieval period many people (the ikko monto 一 向 門 徒 ， the hokke 撕 n如法華門徒， and others), prefer ring to live in a socio-political structure based on certain classical religious notions rather than in one constructed by the busni, resisted incorporation into the bushi structures.18 It was with the eradication of the power of the monastery-shrine complexes in the latter decades of the sixteenth century, and with the establishment of the Tokugawa regime in the early seven teenth century, that there came about the total "im/w-ization" ofjapanese society.
O n the basis of the foregoing considerations it is necessary to revamp certain interpretations of the nature of the political structure in early and medievalj apan. According to a still generally accepted model of that struc ture, the court さ lite ruled the country up to the latter decades of the twelfth century, from which time the military dlite ruled it, through the shogunate, until the late-nineteenth century. Another model, one that best fits the evidence in that it takes into account the power that the monastery-shrine complexes wielded over the centuries from the tenth through the mid-sixteenth, is as follows: from the mid-tenth century 37 O n the issue o f the power o f the monastery-shrine complexes in the early an d medieval periods see KURODA, especially 1980. The Kamalcura shogunate attem pted to lim it the power o f the monastery-shrine complexes by p ro h ib itin g the form ation o f new home-branch (hon matsu) relations am ong monasteries and shrines in the Kyoto area. For an English-language study o f the power o f the Zen institutions in the m edieval period, see COLLCUTT 1981. 18 See H erbert Bix's discussion o f medieval Utki 一 探 ， w hich he describes as "solidarity bands" th a t were "based on the w ill o f heaven" an d the "ancient Japanese beliei in the on e ness o f m en thro u g h a n d w ith the gods." Bix points o u t th at an ikki "was also a ritu al for keep in g alive prefeudal ideas o f im partial ju stice, equality an d equity in a society dom inated by k in ship , hierarchy, and fixed statuses" (B IX 1986, p. 143), through the twelfth, the monastery-shrine complexes controlled so much of the land, and the people who lived on and worked that land, that they, together with the court dite， formed the government in fact if not on paper. Indeed, in that period the court ^lite together with the monasteryshrine Elites formed a single class of people who were usually related by blood: the people who had the highest offices in the major monasteryshrine complexes were often the younger sons of noble families, the older sons of which held the highest court offices at the time. In the period from the late-twelfth through the mid-sixteenth centuries, there was a gradual decline in the power of the monastery-shrine complexes, and yet a num ber of the major ones maintained so much, and in some cases most, of their power, and others (like the Ishiyama Hongan-ji 石山本願寺 in Osaka) came to possess such immense power, that together they formed, so to speak, one leg of the tripod of political power, the other two "legs" being the military dite and the court dite. Therefore, rather than think in terms of the nature of the relation between religious institutions and the state in the early and medieval (at least the first half of the medieval) periods, it is ap propriate to adopt a model proposed by Kuroda Toshio -the "influential parties system" (kenmon taisei 権門f本制) -according to which the monastery-shrine complexes constituted a power bloc (albeit an ununited one) that functioned in effect as a co-ruler of the country for a number of centuries.19 Indeed, it was not until the latter half of the sixteenth century that the bushi had enough power to be able to confront, defeat, and Anal ly eliminate the forces of the major monastery-shrine complexes.
H istoriographical Issues
The second set of questions related to the four general issues with which this essay is concerned is a complex historiographical one regarding the premises with wmch modern scholars approach the study of pre-modern Japanese societies, the issue of why the history of religions is done in the way that it is. In addressing any topic in history, Asian or Western, pre-modern or modern, one might do well to reflect on Voltaire's caustic observation to the effect that history is a pack of tricks that we play on the dead. This "playing of tricks" has to do with the fact that historians approach their topics of research with packs of assumptions that they carry with -or, more accurately stated, are part o f-them. In attempting to acquire an under standing of the nature and structure of pre-modern Japanese societies, it is important to be aware of the assumptions that color that inquiry lest we fall victim to the "retrospective fallacy"20 whereby we read present struc tures into the past. It is also important to avoid what might be called the "infantilization fallacy， " which is rooted in a theory first proposed by Os wald Spengler (1880 Spengler ( -1936 and according to which cultures pass through a life cycle from youth to maturity to old age and death. This theory allows us to treat peoples of the past-i.e., of earlier stages of Spengler*s cycleas simpler, more gullible, and all-round less mature than we are. In a recent piece on "buddhology， " John MARALDO notes that Buddhist scholars "have not reflected sufficiently on their own interpretive stance" (1986， p. 43). Perhaps, as Herbert Bix points out, there are complex ideological reasons for the way in whichjapan studies in the United States and Britain have been conducted since the late 1940s.21
The truth of the matter is that not only religious traditions but Religious Studies itself furthers certain views and values that are in fact indissociable from certain ideological/political ones. The idea that there are non political forms of inquiry is simply a myth (in the ordinary sense) that furthers certain political agendas all the more effectively. Consider, for in stance, two hypothetical Religious Studies scholars who produce studies of Genshin's Ojoyoshu, one of whom expounds on Genshin's oral portrait of the pleasures of paradise, and the other of whom tries to reconstruct Genshin's class biases as manifested in that text. Let me emphasize that what differentiates the works of these scholars is not that the former is a non-political piece and the latter a political one. The distinction is, rath er, between different forms of politics. It is not the case here that I am trying to drag politics into Religious Studies. Indeed, to paraphrase Terry EAGLETON, there is no need to do so because, as with South African sport, politics has been there from the beginning (1983, p. 194) . Again, para phrasing Eagleton, Religious Studies is no t to be upbraided For being political, b u t For being on the whole covertly or unconsciously so -For the blindness with which . . . [it] offers as supposedly "technical," "self-evident， " "objective," "scientific， " or "universal," truths doctrines which with a little reDection 20 T his is H erm an Oom s' expression. 21 B ix argues that after W orld W ar I I "Ja p an studies in the United States an d B rita in was reconstituted along cold-war, anti-Marxist lines," an d that the Japanese past was recast w ith concepts an d assum ptions "derived in large part from American state ideology, whose co n struction o f the past meshed nicely w ith the needs o f Am erican foreign policy" (B IX 1986, pp, xiii-xiv). can be seen to relate to and reinforce the particular interests o f particular groups o f people at particular times (1983, p. 195 ).
It would be naive to believe that modern scholars in Religious Studies produce objective, ideology-free studies of the past. It was Roland Barthes who pointed out that the university critique, in spite of its professed ob jectivity, is postulated upon an ideology as much as any of the types of in terpretative criticism that it accuses of systematic bias and prejudice. This is not a moral critique that calls into doubt the state of the souls of modern academics， but a critique of the shape of our society and the role of the academy in it Speaking of the Tokugawa Period, Herman OOMS states that there were genuine cognitive limitations inherent in the social perceptions o f the ru lin g elite, perceptions which stemmed from their position in society . . . [and that] escaped their consciousness (1984, p. 51) What, we might ask, are our cognitive limitations (assuming that we can ask that question)? I am reminded here of Noam Chomsky's scathing in dictment of the intellectual 6lite of our present society as the "secular priesthood" of the state.
As a general consideration it should also be noted that historical studies of pre-modern societies, not only of Japan but of many countries, tend to be warped in such a way that disproportionate attention is devoted to the famous and powerful members of the societies that are being studied, or, in other words, to the ruling Elites, if for no other reason but that it was members of that class who had the education, the economic wherewithal, and the leisure time to compose the documents that have come down to us and that historians study. As Mikhail BAKHTIN has pointed out, at its very core literary language is the oral and written language of a dominant social group (1981, pp. 289-290) . Thus the views expressed in so many classical texts were, in Joseph KITAGAWA'S words, "based on readingjapanese historical experience through the mental prism of the aristocracy, another form of mythologization of history" (1985, p. 92) . Because of the nature of so many historical documents (and, perhaps, for ideological reasons), it might be tempting to accept Thomas Carlyle's dictum that the history of the world is but the biography of great men. A whole genre of historical writing is founded on that view, and many examples of it can be found among modern studies of the history ofjapanese religions. In some cases scholars appear to favor the "great men" over the "unruly" masses.22 22 Latterly a num ber o f books o n the peasant classes in pre-modern Ja p a n , in c lu d in g the one by B IX 1986, have been attem pting to compensate for the lack o f studies o f the peasants.
As a rule, the masses are seen as passengers of the ship of state and are not considered to have been major players in the religious dramas.
In the context of modern scholarship, both Asian and Western, on the Buddhist tradition, the term M history of Buddhism" has come to be large ly synonymous with M history of Buddhist doctrine," or M history of ideas" ； that is, the history of the development of a vast variety of views on a wide range of issues that were espoused by numerous schools of Buddhism and various lines of Buddhist masters over the centuries from the fifth century B.C.E. to the present. The focus of such studies is on what those schools and masters thought: how they interpreted and reinterpreted such con cepts as enlightenment, buddha-nature, emptiness, and so forth. That kind of "history of Buddhism" is a variant of the "great man" type of his tory, but with an added level of abstraction: that is, the physic of the great master is discarded and there is left just a psyche, a free-floating, ahistorical, ethereal corpus of "great ideas." In the West, Buddhism has often been portrayed as an other-worldly tradition dedicated to the private salvation of the individual. Possibly more than any other tradition, it has been reli gionized, doctrinalized, spiritualized, other-worldly'ized, and individ ualized in ways and to degrees that simply do not fit the classical Buddhist case but that do fit the case of some modern Western views of religion. Many studies tone up the "enchanted" dimension of the Buddhist tradi tion at the expense of other dimensions. Pierre BOURDIEU, who is speak ing of art history in the following quotation but whose words are easily translatable into the realm of the history of religion, points out that art history [as conventionally done] gives free reign to celebratory contemplation and finds in the sacred character o f its object every pretext for a hagiographic hermeneutics superbly indifferent to the question o f the social conditions in which works are produced and circulate (1977， p . 1).
Another general problem that is encountered with regard to historio graphical questions is a simple but most serious one: namely, because mod ern scholars rely on Japanese sources, both primary and secondary, in conducting their research on pre-modern Japanese societies, they in evitably transmit views contained in those works. For example, many Western works on the history ofjapanese religions have been influenced, directly or indirectly, by the Hasshu koyo 八宗綱要， which was written in 1268 by the Hoss5 monk Gy5nen 凝 然 （ 1240-1321)• In that work Gyonen interpreted the nature and structure of the Nara and Heian schools of Buddhism in a rigid "sectarian" way that is misleading and largely incor rect. The problems with Gyonen'sview have been demonstrated by several modern scholars,23 but nonetheless, as AKAMATSU Toshihide points out, its influence has continued down to the present (1967, p. 311) .Also, many modern Japanese works on the history of religions are sectarian tracts that present pictures that are highly colored by the views of the branches of the traditions to which the authors of those works belong.
As to the first major issue raised above, that is, the intimate relation be tween Buddhism and Shinto in the pre-modern period, it is possible to identify several reasons why that intimacy is sometimes overlooked. Even though latterly it is frequently acknowledged that it is impossible at times to "demarcate" Buddhism and Shinto in pre-modern Japanese society,24 many studies make such a demarcation; i.e.， they treat B uddhism and Shin to as two separate and distinct traditions in the face of and despite the evi dence that they were not As an example of the degree to which Buddhist and Shinto institutions are segregated in some modern works, neither the N iho n bukkydshi jite n (ONO 1979) nor the K o ji meisetsu d aijite n (KANAOKA 1970) , standard reference works for the study of the history of Buddhism and Buddhist monasteries injapan, contains an entry on the aforemen tioned Gion shrine, presumably because thatinstitution is termed a shrine and is, accordingly, considered to be a Shinto as opposed to a Buddhist in stitution, the latter ofwhich are theconcern ofthose reference works (ONO 1979 and KANAOKA 1970) .
Moreover, there is a tendency on the part of some scholars to take the Shinto of the ruling dite of premodern eras for Shinto in general, and to fail to recognize that the vast bulk of what we call Shinto was local cults that were concerned not with state legitimation myths and rituals but with fertility and disease. Also, the Shinto of the ruling dite was less a "religion, " in the sense of a set of soteriological beliefs and practices, than an ideologi cal support structure for the imperium, and it began to appear as a sepa rate, autonomous tradition in the medieval period in that context and for that purpose.
A fundamental reason for the tendency to treat Buddhism and Shinto as completely separate traditions has to do with the modern Western "genus-species" view of religion that divides religion into a number of forms: "primitive religions," "world religions， " "gnostic religions， " and so forth. In keeping with this view, because Buddhism and Shinto are con sidered to be two species of the "world religions" genus -or perhaps even members of different genera, Buddhism being a member of the "world re ligions" genus, and Shinto of the "primitive religions" genus -then ipso facto they are， and must always have been throughout history, separate and distinct traditions. Thus the genus-species model of religion is im posed upon and read back into Japanese history. Those who accept this view assume that in Japanese history people and institutions must have been either Buddhist or Shintoist, but not both at the same time, and were some people to have behaved as though they were both, then somehow something was awry. Some modern scholars have cast doubt on the univer sal applicability of the concept of reli gion and others, have suggested that we do away with the concept entirely.25
So far in this essay we have accepted the common understanding of the word religion according to which there are numerous phenomena "out there" in the world that are sui generis religious in character, and that, ac cordingly, the task of the historian of religions is to identify, gather, and interpret those religious phenomena. However, some deadly blows have been rained on this "essentially essentialist" view of religion by a number of modern, especially European, scholars whose works cause us to turn our attention away from the so-called religious phenomena themselves and to the sets of assumptions that underlie the view that there are such things as inherently religious phenomena. Thus the rudimentary ques tion is not what are the religious phenomena but, rather, why do we, as students of "religion， " assume that there are such phenomena "out there," and what are the sets of criteria that we employ when we identify a certain phenomenon, a certain human event, as a religious (as apposed to a politi cal, etc.) one. To paraphrase Terry EAGLETON, we might ask if it is even possible to speak of religion without perpetuating the illusion that reli gion exists as a distinct, bounded object of knowledge (1983， pp. 204-205) .
A problem also lurks in the common usage of the word religion in the singular. We might ask if there is, or ever was, Japanese religion (singular). The religious discourse of any age (not to mention across the ages) was not a single, unified one at all; rather it was a tension-filled, multi-valent field of competing discourses that were differentiated one from the other not primarily along horizontal sectarian/denominational lines (i.e. Buddhism, Shinto, Confucianism, etc.), but along the vertical axis of class divisions 25 For example, Sm i t h 1962. James Foard disagrees w ith S m ith on this m atter. W hile ac know ledging that we w ill never fin d adequate definitions for words like religion, Taoism, B u d dhism , and the like, Foard says th at "this does n ot mean th at I side w ith W ilfred Cantw ell S m ith in ab andoning such words. Instead, I fin d them qu ite u s e fu l;I w ould ju s t like greater specificity as to how they are being used in specific situations." See FOARD 1985, p. 20. and urban-rural divisions. It has been the tendency for scholars to over play the sectarian/denominational divisions in the Japanese religious fab ric, and to fail to address adequately the class-based divisions. Moreover, the familiar couplet "Japanese Religion" is heavily ideological in that it in fers unity and continuity in Japanese culture and thus it obfuscates the diversity that was constantly manifested in the vertical (class) divisions in J apanese societies over the centuries. It allows for evolutionary transitions in history, but it has no room for sharp breaks, for fractures in the smooth fabric of history, for dialectics. Japanese history was a bumpier ride than the phrase 4 < Japanese Religion1 * implies.
R eligio n, Society，and "Great Ideas"
In regard to the second main issue raised above， developments in the re ligious world must be understood in terms of the ways in which they reflected and addressed developments in the societies of the times in which those developments took place. It is important to steer clear of the isola tionist fallacy according to which, in this context, developments in the re ligious discourses came about primarily as the result of dynamics inherent to those discourses. There are, I suggest, several reasons for the tendency of some studies to deal with the development of institutions, rituals, and doctrines in isolation from the broader context of the societies in which they developed and existed. A perhaps obvious reason for the isolationist tendency is that no scholar of pre-modern J apanese societies is an expert on every dimension of those societies. Many Buddhist scholars, for ex ample, are very familiar with the teachings of one or other Buddhist master, the person on whom their research is concentrated, but less famil iar with the economic and political structures of the society of the period in which that master lived and taught. Consequently, for instance, Shinran 親鸞（ 1173~1262), the founder of the True Pure Land school of Bud dhism in the early Kamakura period, is not infrequently spoken about without reference to the major political shifts that were taking place at that time: it is as though Shinran could have lived at any time at all; as though the major political developments that took place in his time had little or notmng to do with the shape of his teaching; as though Smnran's True Pure Land movement had little or no political context or agenda; and as though his teachings evolved simply by the rules of their own internal logic.
A major reason for this "isolation" tendency may have to do with anoth er aspect of the common, modern (Western) understanding of religion that allows one to pull "a religion" out of its social-political-economic-cul tural setting and examine it in isolation from that setting as though each "religion" were, so to speak, a closed circuit that need not be plugged in somewhere for sense to be made of it In the words of Fitz John Porter Poole, from an anthropological perspective, . . . the curious assumption that religion could be studied almost in vacuo became untenable in the midst o f a newfound functionalist concern to see religious phenomena intricately suspended in broader webs o f cultural sig nificance and subtly embedded in wider arrays o f social institutions (P O O LE 1986, pp. 411).
"Buddhism" and "Shinto" can be abstracted from the general fabric of Japanese history only in a highly reified and wholly theoretical way. In the same way that it is misleading to speak in reified terms of Christianity "in" medieval European society (that society was Christian), it is also mislead ing to speak of Buddhism "in" early and medieval J apanese societies, for those societies were Buddhist. In other words, Buddhism was not an autonomous "thing" that had, as it were, a fenced off place in the Japanese world, or an accretion that was somehow stuck on to Japanese societies by some kind of removable tape; it was endemic to, at the very heart of, those societies. While it is true that the pre-modern Japanese were Buddhists, they were also, at the same time, Shintoists, Taoists， and Confucians. Jap anese Buddhists, in other words， were notjust Buddhists: they were all en meshed in an extremely complex and intricate economic-political-socialcultural fabric that was informed in many ways by Buddhist influences, but also by a variety of other sets of influences in such a mutually interpenetratingandinterpermeatingwaythat Buddhism cannot be abstracted from that fabric without transforming it into something that it never was, and without, at the same time, rending the fabric so badly that it bears lit tle resemblance to the reality.26 Thus, to try to understand and explain the development of religious institutions in early and medieval Japanese societies by examining only or primarily a sequence of great masters or a causally unfolding line of "great ideas" is to overlook major sets of deter mining mechanisms that lie behind that development, and therefore to warp the examination.
In regard especially to doctrine there is a tendency to treat doctrinal statements as extrahistorical phenomena that can be understood in their own terms as exercises in philosophy, as self-enclosed packets of "great ideas." The study of a doctrine in isolation from its cultural setting can be, it goes without saying, a valuable and fruitful intellectual pursuit in its own right, but it is also necessary to "ground" the doctrine under consideration in its cultural and historical context if the reasons for its development, the nuances of its meaning, and its full significance are to be understood and appreciated. This is because it is not primarily ideas b u t structures -eco nomic, political, social, and so forth-that form the foundation on which any society is built and that determine to a great degree the shape of that society's religious discourse, and those structures must be taken into ac count if any particular aspect of a given society is to be explained with ac curacy. By focusing too narrowly on "great ideas" we run the risk of trying to explain complex issues in excessively narrow terms, and thus of forcing many of the great masters of the past to sleep in procrustean beds.
Like doctrinal developments, the development of religious institutions and rituals also must be understood in the broad context and against the background of the societies in which those institutions and rituals arose and functioned, for they were established and had meaning in an environ ment that was intimately conjoined to the rest of society.
It must be noted that this essay does not make the reductionist claim that institutional, ritual, and doctrinal developments can be accounted for fully by reference solely to economic and political factors, for such a claim would be the equivalent, in the words of The Philosophical Lexicon， of at tempting "to deduce [Einstein's] . . . special theory of relativity from the social structure of the Zurich patent office" (DENNETT and LAMBERT 1978， pp. 5-6) . Nor is it being claimed that religious structures are mere ly reflections of the economic and political structures of a given society: religious structures are both the effects and the causes (more the former than the latter, I suggest) of economic and political structures, and the re lation among them is symbiotic.
O n a simpler level,a major reason for the tendency of scholars to deal with the development of institutions， rituals and doctrines inisolation from the broader context of the societies in which they developed may be found in the fragmented condition of the modern university curriculum whereby, in this age of "professionalism," one can specialize in one aspect of a particular society in a particular period without having to master the other aspects of that society in that period. In the case ofjapanese studies, for example, it is possible to become a specialist in Japanese Buddhism without studying Shinto, a specialist in religion without studying econom ics or politics, or a specialist in history without studying the religion of the period of one's specialty. As a consequence of this situation, scholars of pre-modern Japanese societies are inclined to assign disproportionate im portance to those dimensions of society that they know and understand well, and to underplay or undervalue those that they do not.
R itu a l, Myth, M agic
In regard to the third issue raised above, the comparative importance of religious institutions, rituals, and doctrines, it is apparent, and curious, that much modern scholarship on the history ofjapanese religions has tended to overlook institutional and ritual issues in favor of doctrinal ones. Thus there is in English a disproportionate number of studies ofjapanese Buddhist doctrines and masters, and extremely few studies of religious institutions and rituals despite the fact (or at least the claim made earlier) that religion was important in pre-modern J apan less for doctrinal than for institutional and ritual reasons. Why there is such a disproportion is difficult to say. It seems that many people in the West are interested injapanese religions less in order to understand and explain their development injapanese societies-which would necessitate an examination of the eco nomic and political developments in the periods under considerationthan for existential or therapeutic reasons. In this regard, perhaps the psychopathology of contemporary American society as diagnosed by Christopher LASCH (1978 and 1984) , and the reasons for the present popularity of Asian religions in American society as analyzed by Harvey COX (1977, especially pp. 74-90) , can help to account for the present state ofjapanese religious studies in the West.
In regard to the institutions, rituals, and doctrines troika, it may be the case that we are attempting to replace an old set of fixed notions (Bud dhism, Shinto, religion, politics, etc.) with a new fixed set that is equally inapplicable to pre-modern Japanese societies. This may indeed be the case, but it remains to be seen, and I suggest that we do not assume it to be true a p r io r i. It might be argued that there is evidence, at least in the case of the structure of the M t Hiei-Hie community， that there was an inherent distinction between ritual and doctrine in that community in that some members of it, notably the "scholar monks" (gakuryo 学侶 >,were charged specifically with studying the sutras and writing what we would call doctrinal treatises, whereas others (a larger number) were responsible for learning and practicing rituals. And yet, there may be problems here in that the duty of the gakuryo might have been notjust "doctrinal" activity but general intellectual activity that had to do with both doctrinal and ritual matters. Thus the distinction may have been between "thinkers" and "doers," rather than between doctrinalists and ritualists, for it was in fact the case that the gakuryo were also the leaders of the rituals. This matter requires further investigation and clarification.
A factor that might help to account for the lack of sophisticated, in-depth studies ofjapanese rituals is the "demythologizing" exercises of a century ago, which, conducted as they were in a climate of empiricism and rationalism, tended to denigrate myth and ritual. Myth is still taken by some to mean a story that is both primitive and false, and ritual smacks of magic and superstition. Accordingly, some scholars of religion seem to consider rituals to be comparatively unimportant, to be secondary or an cillary to doctrine; that is, rituals are believed to express or act out the truths contained in doctrines. It appears to be assumed that what people thought and believed was prior to and more important than what they practiced, and this, as suggested earlier, is a reading into pre-modern Jap anese societies of a quality that may have characterized some religious tra ditions in the pre-modern world, but not the Japanese. Frits Staal urges us to "abandon the view that underlies most contemporary approaches to ritual: the view that ritual is symbolic, and depends on doctrine or belief," and he argues that in Asia rituals do not symbolize or depend on doctrines. Indeed, says he, "it is the other way around: one of the most important functions of doctrine is to make sense of ritual" (1984, pp. 18-19) .27
In the foregoing analysis of historical and historiographical problems in the study of pre-modern Japanese religions, much of the blame for those problems is attributed to certain ways of thinking that have come down to us from the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. Richard Gardner applies this analysis to the matter of the relation between religion and art. Accord ing to GARDNER, To p u t a complex matter simply, religion and art, as these categories develop from the E nlightenm ent onward, frequently define one another by similarity and contrast w ithin the context o f efforts to define the nature o f perception, epistemology, and the symbol. The problem o f the relation o f art and religion, in other words, is at root a problem o f deploying categories and 27 I t may well be the case that ritu al took precedence over doctrine in the case o f the W estern religions also. According to Stephen REYNOLDS, "In bo th Ju d a ism an d Christianity, w orship is the act o f ultim ate self-determination. Doctrine arises out o f it, rather than preced in g if * (1977, p . 22) . distinctions bequeathed us from the E nlightenm ent (1985, p. 3) . James Foard, on the other hand, suggests that the root problem in regard to our understanding of pre-modern Japanese religions maybe traced not so much to categories inherited by us from Enlightenment thinkers, but to sources that are both more ancient and more modern than Enlighten ment thought. In FOARD's view, the distinction, even opposition, between religion and magic, which is as old as Augustine's denunciation o f theurgy, is at the root o f most o f our problems in understanding Japanese religion. . . [And, he adds,] as long as we have ju s t "magic， " for which symbolic anthropology provides only universal, ahistorical explanations, and not "magics," or as I prefer "techniques， " which have distinc tive, historical traditions, we will be blind to how such practices functioned in japane se history and society, where they came from, under what circumstances they developed, and how they are used, distinctively or not, in the new religions (1985, p. 14) .
Thus, in addition to the yokes imposed on us by Enlightenment thinkers, we are also working under the influences of such disparate figures as Augustine and some modern social anthropologists.
R eligious vs. Secular 1
Finally, turning to the fourth major issue raised above, the relation be tween religion and politics in pre-modern J apanese societies, a common modern Western assumption appears to be that the religious and the secular (religion and politics, religion and economics, etc.) are, and indeed ought to be, separate entities, and this assumption influences its bearers* interpretations of the nature and structure ofthose societies. One can find, for example, debates over whether a particular movement in pre-modern Japan was primarily religious or primarily political in character, as if the movement in question had been mainly one or the other but not both at the same time, or as if it were possible to categorize it as having been a cer tain percentage of the one and the remaining percentage of the other.
Moreover, it appears to be because of the fact that some scholars accept the religious-secular-separation premise that their works have a critical, if not contemptuous, attitude toward the clergy and religious institutions seemingly in direct proportion to the degree of economic, political, and military power that the clergy and the monastery-shrine complexes pos sessed. Thus, not infrequently an adjective like avaricious modifies the word monk in the case of a monk who owned or controlled great wealth.
Wealthy courtiers, on the other hand, are usually called successful, pros perous, and so on, but rarely avaricious simply on the basis of the fact that they were wealthy. Similarly, an adjective like villainous often modifies the word abbot in the case of abbots who wielded military power, especially when those abbots opposed or defied the "state" (i.e., the court or the shogunate). Shoguns and daimyo who wielded military power are never called villainous simply because of the fact that they wielded such power; on the contrary, they are termed formidable, mighty, etc. And monasteryshrine complexes that possessed considerable political, economic, and military power are frequently called degenerate, corrupt, secularized, and so forth, whereas the shogunate, which also wielded such power, is, for that very reason, termed healthy, stable, well-established, etc. Thus the language of some modern works on the history of Buddhism is shot through with expressions that manifest, on the part of their authors， the acceptance of a dualistic view according to which religious institutions ought to wield only "spiritual" and not "secular" power, and, conversely, that political institutions should wield only secular and not religious power.
It is, perhaps, easy to find injapanese history many things that the cler gy **ought not to have done." Monks, for example, ought notto have striven to accumulate wealth, for such activity offends against the codes of the clerical life, but the fact is that many monks did amass great wealth. Also, monks ought not to have had sexual liaisons with women, other men, or boys, but the fact is that some had such liaisons. And the monastery-shrine complexes ought not to have maintained armies of "monk-warriors" (sohei イ曽兵) ， b u t some did. Thus it is possible to make a long list of the things that the clergy and the religious institutions ought not to have done in pre modern Japan. Such an enterprise is not, however, the doing of history, the point ofwhich is to describe and analyze, insofar as it is possible to do so, how Japanese societies developed and why they took the turns that they did, as well as to understand why historians, both pre-modern and mod ern, have treated those societies in the ways that they have. To take the aforementioned sohei phenomenon as a case in point:
In the early and medieval periods, the sohei were called "wicked monks"
(akuso 悪 僧 )• The reason why those monks were deemed wicked was, I sug gest, not so much that their bearing and use of arms was a transgression of Buddhist ethics and the clerical codes, which indeed they were, but that those monks did not submit to the ordinances of the central administration in regard to such matters as the proper acquisition of ordination licenses and the building of privately funded cloisters, and they could not be con trolled by that administration. To put it differently, the monks were termed wicked primarily because they acted in a manner that did not serve the best interests of the ruling dite (which included, in many cases, the monks' masters, i.e., the abbots of the monastery-shrine complexes) who enacted the laws and wrote most of the texts, and who wanted to repress the sohei so that they might have a freer hand to control a still larger portion of the land. Instead of accepting the ruling kite's language and joining them in condemning the monks as akusd, it would be more valuable to try to un derstand how and why the sohei came to be: how the collapse of the ritsuryo system, and the rise in the number of estates controlled by the monasteryshrine complexes, led rather naturally to the development of armed units of monks whose main duty, at least initially, was to police the complexes' precincts. It is ， I suggest, incorrect to assume with reference to pre-modern Japa nese societies that politics and religion had different spheres of operation, the former having to do with public, "this-worldly" issues, and the latter with private, "other-worldly" ones. If the word religion is taken in its ab solutely narrowest sense, whereby it refers to a set of private beliefs, then it may be possible to keep religion and politics separate, but there is no society, pre-modern or modern, in which religion functioned only in that narrow sense as simply and strictly a private affair. Belief may be strictly private, although this too is highly problematical. If religion is understood in a broader sense, whereby it refers to a body of institutionalized express ions of beliefs, rituals, observances, and social practices found in a given cultural context, then religion and politics greatly overlap insofar as the latter has to do with the regulation and control of people living in society. Throughout history most states have, in fact, recognized this reality, as it demonstrated by their supervision and control of the "religions options" (meaning also the "political options"） available to their citizens. In ja p a nese nistory, for example, various traditions, such as the/wフ w/wm不受不施 branch of the Nichiren school, the ikko 一 向 branch of the True Pure Land school, and Christianity, were banned when they were considered to pres ent a threat to the incumbent pontico-religious power/authority struc tures. Thus the only "religious" options allowed were those deemed "politically" acceptable.
Moreover, and more importantly, it is incorrect to assume that the ac quisition of political, economic, and military power on the part of clerics and the monastery-shrine complexes is ipso facto a sign of corruption, degeneration and/or secularization, and equally incorrect to assume that there was once a time in Japan -or even, for that matter， in India-when religious communities were utterly devoid of "secular" power (assuming, for the sake of this point, that there was a notion of purely secular power in pre-modern Japan and India). It is not possible for an established com munity to enjoy such a "pure" (?) condition, and, at any rate, such a con dition is not necessarily one that the Japanese religious communities aspired to; indeed, there is no historical reason to assume that Japanese clerics or the monastery-shrine communities had such an aspiration. His tory simply does not support that assumption. From the very first, clerics and their religious institutions possessed various forms of political and eco nomic power, and therefore to accuse the politically, economically, and militarily powerful clerics and religious institutions of having become, by reason of their accumulation of such forms of power, corrupt, degenerate, and/or secularized, is to imply, incorrectly, that there was once a time in Japanese history when clerics and religious institutions did not have "secular" (political and economic) power. If we are to insist on using such morally judgmental language, then we must describe Japanese clerics and religious institutions as having been from the first corrupt, degenerate, and secularized. There has been a tendency in the field of Japanese Religious Studies to preserve religion from the muck and mire of politics and economics, as is evidenced by a preoccupation on the part of some scholars with keeping religion -especially Buddhism, and most especially the Zen tradition -"pureノ '
Although it is true that clerics and the monastery-shrine complexes pos sessed political and economic power from the first, it is not true that the very possession of that power made them corrupt, etc., unless, that is, one wishes to make the argument that it is ipso facto wrong for clerics and re ligious institutions to wield such power. It certainly does not appear that the early and medieval religious communities and their supporters be lieved that to be the case. Furthermore, Japanese clerics of the early and medieval periods who did not recognize a disparity between, on the one hand, the ideals of their tradition which, for example, disallowed the bear ing and use of arms, and, on the other hand， the practice of maintaining armies of "monk-warriors," were not necessarily being disingenuous or hypocritical. Cultures have the ability to gear their discourses in such a way as to make seemingly contradictory phenomena perfectly compatible.
The Approach o f Japanese Scholars
Lastly， we might mention several factors that might help to account for the reasons why some Japanese scholars* works manifest the problems raised above. Perhaps the most obvious reason is that Japanese scholar ship of the past century has been greatly influenced by Western ways of doing scholarship. Japanese universities are "shaped like" European and American universities: the academic disciplines injapanese universities are generally the same as those in Western universities. This is pointedly the case with regard to the study of religions. For instance, Kishimoto Hideo, who was one of the fathers of the discipline of religious studies in Japan and whose views have had a great influence in that field, accepted premises "stemming from the intellectual tradition that traces its origins to Comtean positivism" (REID 1986, p. 149) . Like many Western scholars, Kishimoto was a positivist who accepted the hard distinction between sub ject and object (and thus, by extension, between religion and politics).
Also, some Japanese historians appear to accept the premise that reli gious institutions were, as a rule, oppressors of the populace in the early and medieval periods, and therefore they write in a condemnatory style vis-含 -vis those institutions. Even if those scholars' claim as to the oppres sive nature of the monastery-shrine complexes is true, it might, I suggest, be possible to demonstrate that the monasteries were certainly no more, and possibly less, oppressive than either the court or the shogunate. Be sides, as was mentioned earlier, many people in medieval Japan evident ly preferred to live under the authority of the monastery-shrine complexes rather than under that of the shogunate. At any rate, in pre-Tokugawa Japan the monastery-shrine socioeconomic structures had as much right to exist as had those of the bushi. Other Japanese scholars tend to under estimate the amount of power that the monastery-shrine complexes pos sessed, especially during the Kamakura period, and, consequently, they neglect to study them.
Japanese scholars of religion, like their Western counterparts, are also influenced by various classical materials, such as the aforementioned H as shu koyo, and they transmit views contained therein.
In the Tokugawa period, when a number oi important scholarly works on the history of Japan were written, it was commonly assumed that only members of the bushi class had the right to wield political and military power, and this attitude was read back into history with the result that some Tokugawa historians were condemnatory of rich and powerful clerics and religious institutions as usurpers of forms of power that they had no right to possess. Furthermore, in the Tokugawa period Buddhism came under attack by Neo-Confucians, National Learning scholars, Im perialists, and others, and the negative image of Buddhism and its history that was generated by those critics continues to color J apanese scholarship on religions in pre-modern Japanese societies.
Moreover, the works of some Japanese scholars on premodern Japan reflect the shape that the Japanese religious world had in the earlier part of this century, a shape that was imparted to the Japanese mindscape by Meiji thinkers toward the end of the nineteenth century. As I understand it, for ideological reasons those Meiji thinkers redefined the structure of the Japanese religious traditions by separating the Shinto and Buddhist traditions and by inventing at least one new religion (State Shinto), with the result that the shape of the Japanese religious world from that time forward was dramatically different from what it had been in the preced ing dozen or more centuries. In Meiji'esque style, some scholars appear to accept the taxonomy according to which the Japanese landscape/mindscape was dotted with a number of autonomous, distinct traditions (Buddhism, Shinto, etc.) from time immemorial. This view is particularly pronounced in the treatment of Shinto which is often portrayed romantically and unquestioningly as the original, indiginous religious tradition of Japan, as having been concerned primarily over the centuries with the wellbeing of the imperial house, and as having survived the vagaries and ravages of the centuries quite unscathed. Thus the Meiji ideologues' victory has been much greater than ordinarily imagined.
Conclusion
I n conclusion, there appears to be a consensus on the part of a number of modern scholars, both Japanese and Western，that there are serious problems in the study of pre-modern Japanese religions. In the words of James Foard, "what we have had is indeed a taxonomy or a classification system... [which,] like the category 'religion* itself, is a product of the acad emy, and hence is the academy's responsibility" （ 1985， p. 11). Happily' it appears that a number of the aforementioned issues are now beginning to be addressed.
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